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Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and
intelligence
RICHARD J. ALDRICH*
Abstract. The world of intelligence has grown exponentially over the last decade. This article
suggests that prevailing explanation of this expansion – the spectre of ‘new terrorism’ –
reflects serious misunderstandings. Much of the emergency legislation which has extended
the power of the state so remarkably was already sitting in the pending trays of oﬃcials in
the late 1990s. Instead, the rise of both the ‘new terrorism’ and its supposed nemesis – the
secret state – both owe more to long-term structural factors. Globalisation has accelerated
a wide range of sub-military transnational threats, of which the ‘new terrorism’ is but one
example. Meanwhile the long-promised engines of global governance are nowhere in sight.
In their absence, the underside of a globalising world is increasingly policed by ‘vigilant
states’ that resort to a mixture of military power and intelligence power in an attempt to
address these problems. Yet the intelligence services cannot meet the improbable demands
for omniscience made by governments, nor can they square their new enforcer role with
vocal demands by global civil society for improved ethical practice.
Introduction: the fall and rise of secret service
Some secret services were almost extinguished at the end of the Cold War. In the
early 1990s they endured swingeing cuts and US senators even spoke of abolishing
the CIA. Now the CIA enjoys resources that have expanded beyond its wildest
expectations. In 2009, the US intelligence budget was approximately twice its Cold
War level, at a dizzy $48 billion per annum. Similar narratives abound in other
Western countries. The Dutch foreign intelligence service was actually abolished in
the early 1990s and then hurriedly re-established with improved funding. The UK
Security Service, known colloquially as MI5 and based at Thames House, found
itself all but redundant in the mid-1990s. It is now scaled to double in size by 2010
and more than half its staﬀ have been with the agency less than two years. Despite
this unprecedented growth, few intelligence service chiefs are optimistic about the
future. Meanwhile the ‘diet and binge’ approach that states have taken to their
intelligence and security services tells us much about the paradoxical impact of
globalisation upon the agencies.
Recent academic writing on intelligence has been somewhat myopic. The last
five years has witnessed an expanding literature on current intelligence agencies,
security services and special forces. Almost without exception, intelligence has been
* I am indebted to the Leverhulme Trust for a fellowship that facilitated this article. The paper was
first given at ECPR Pisa 2007 and other locations and I would like to record my gratitude to those
who have oﬀered comments.
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viewed through the interpretative prism of ‘The War on Terror’. There have been
many studies on the intelligence background to the events of 9/11, on the invasion
of Afghanistan, on Guantanamo and the hunt for bin Laden. There have been
innumerable essays that seek to analyse the Iraqi WMD fiasco. We are now
confronted with a further wave of books about the more recent attacks in Europe,
including the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the 7/7 bombings in London. Yet
there has been little eﬀort to connect intelligence with mainstream debates within
international relations.1
Defining the spirit of the age is a notoriously tricky business. Despite the
anxious rhetoric of political leaders, the idea that we inhabit an era defined by ‘new
terrorism’ is somewhat questionable. We live primarily in an era of globalisation
and since the end of the Cold War the complex debate over the nature of the
changes associated with globalisation, their texture and meaning has formed the
dominant theme in international relations. This is not only reflected in academic
discourse but also wider public understanding. The more influential popular books
on international aﬀairs over the last five years have focussed not on terrorism, but
on the impact of globalisation and related issues of global justice.2 Moreover, the
most problematic issues confronting us over the next ten years are also associated
with ‘global uncertainty’, including third world debt, financial instability, climate
change and pandemics together with a range of networked threats involving diverse
illegitimate actors.3 The current economic downturn has also led to a greater
emphasis on intelligence to defend economic security.4 However, we have seen few
attempts to consider the connections between the intelligence services and
globalisation.5
We might think about the impact of globalisation upon intelligence in at least
three ways. Firstly, in terms of targets, globalisation has created a borderless world
in which states move clumsily but where their many illicit opponents move
elegantly. Globalisation delivered improved levels of trade and, until recently,
fabulous new wealth. But as Moises Naim has argued, it is unevenly distributed
and also oﬀers opportunities for new criminal activity and political violence on a
considerable scale. Naim suggests that illicit activity is not just about organised
crime, but also about the parallel eﬀects of money laundering, corruption, weapons
proliferation and the rise of kleptocractic regimes – the ‘Five Wars of Globalisation
1 On 9/11, see for example, R. A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks; Intelligence Reform in the wake
of 9/11 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); B. Gertz, Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence
Failures Led to September 11 (New York: Regnery 2002); L. Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda
and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007); A. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI
and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
2 Of many populist discussions we might mention: J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New
York: Norton, 2002) and M. Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004); T. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Farrar, Giraux and Strauss, 2005).
3 A. Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, International Security, 27:
3 (2002/3), pp. 30–58; A. Guelke, Terrorism and Global Disorder Political Violence in the
Contemporary World (London: IB Tauris, 2006); T. Barkawi, Globalization and War (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
4 ‘Pentagon, bankers prepare for economic warfare’, Foreign Policy, 9 April 2009.
5 However, see S. D. Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-imagining, Reforming and
Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’, Risk Manage-
ment, 7:1 (2005) pp. 23–41; R. J. Aldrich, ‘Setting priorities in a World of Changing Threats’, in
S. Tsang, (ed.), Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism (New York: Praeger,
2006), pp. 158–71.
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that we are losing’. While international crime is nothing new, he suggests that we
are now seeing novel, adaptive and undiﬀerentiated structures that are highly
decentralised, horizontal, and fluid. They specialise in cross border movement and
are also very proficient in the use of modern technologies. In short, they are the
miscreants of globalisation.6
James N. Rosenau, in an essay on Ian Fleming’s iconic creation ‘James Bond’,
has commented on the curious way that life has come to resemble art. The
infamous Bond villains – Dr No, Goldfinger and Blofeld – have always been
post-Cold War figures. They are not far from the real enemies of the last two
decades – part master criminal – part arms smuggler – part terrorist – part warlord.
They are often endangering not only the security of a single country, but the safety
of the whole world. Although no real-life equivalent yet boasts a private monorail,
remarkably, drug cartels in Columbia have begun to use their own submarines to
move cocaine to the United States. Like our modern enemies, Bond villains utilise
the gaps between sovereign states and thrive on secrecy. In the 2008 film, ‘The
Quantum of Solace’, counter-terrorism was already yesterday’s business and
instead Bond looked forward to the next decade where the enemies exploit climate
change and environmental hazard.7
In reality, the shift towards transnational targets has presented intelligence
services with major problems precisely because these opponents live in the seams
of national jurisdictions. Traditionally, services have co-operated hesitantly,
sharing intelligence mostly with preferred partners on a bilateral basis. Intelligence
services have now been forced to share more widely, with exotic partners and with
private agencies in an eﬀort to keep up with their elusive opponents. Practitioners
often speak of the shift from ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’ but they rarely
elaborate on the degree of discomfiture that this has involved for services which are
fundamentally Westphalian in their outlook. In 2005, one recently retired CIA
oﬃcer with some twenty years experience remarked acerbically that ‘there are no
“friendly” liaison services, not even among those allies who are historically,
philosophically, and economically closest to us [. . .] they are not on our side: they
are on their own side’.8
A second impact of globalisation has been to re-shape the role of intelligence
services making them more action-orientated. Economic globalisation is well
advanced, but the engines of global governance which were supposed to help to
police it have not arisen naturally and, insofar as they exist, they have proved to
be notably weak. By the late 1990s, national governments had to place their
intelligence and security services in the front line against a range of elusive but
troublesome opponents. The new targets that secret services are confronting are
more ruthless and violent than those we encountered during the Cold War. Taken
together with the kinetic business of counter-terrorism, the result has been that the
secret services are doing less analysis and estimating and more ‘fixing’, enforcing
and disrupting. Western governments have moved their intelligence services away
6 M. Naim, ‘The Five Wars of Globalization’, Foreign Policy (January–February 2003), pp. 29–37;
M. Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traﬃckers and Copycats are Highjacking the Global Economy
(London: William Heinemann, 2005).
7 D. C. Earnest and J. N. Rosenau, ‘The Spy Who Loved Globalization’, Foreign Policy, 120 (2000)
pp. 88–91.
8 G. Jones, ‘It’s a Cultural Thing: Thoughts on a Troubled CIA’, Orbis, 50:1 (2006), pp. 25–41.
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from pure intelligence towards the kind of intervention that looks more like covert
action. Some of this is being franchised out to the new private military companies
(PMCs) and free-lance secret services.
Thirdly, although globalisation has failed to produce eﬀective global govern-
ance, it has spawned a vast network of global civil society and human rights
campaigners. In their wake they have brought high expectations for ethical foreign
policy, regulation, transparency and accountability. One result has been that the
European intelligence and security services – including those in the UK – went
through a regulatory revolution in the 1990s in which the European Convention on
Human Rights was written into their core guidance. Everywhere, secret services are
being monitored and examined, if not always called to account. Intelligence
services used to operate in the shadows, but they now work under the spotlight of
a globalised media that is no longer much troubled by rules of state secrecy.
Increasingly, accountability now seems to flow from a globalised network of
activists and journalists, not from parliamentary oversight committees. In part this
reflects what some see as a further impact of globalisation, namely the corrosion
of state secrecy.9
These contradictory developments point the way to an emerging crisis in the
realm of secret service. In spite of their recent expansion, the intelligence and
security services do not have the capacity to deal with all the ills of globalisation
that governments are asking them to address. Indeed, while they are surged against
the ‘new terrorism’ there is little capacity left for them to address other important
issues. In short, it is a great time to be a drug dealer or a white collar criminal.
More importantly, now that Western secret services have been reinvented as the
‘toilet cleaners of globalization’ they cannot be, at one and same time, tough
enough to deal eﬀectively with their ruthless new opponents, or soft enough to
satisfy human rights watchers. While governments and ministers acquire extra-
ordinary new powers, the intelligence and security services are taking much of the
blame for the erosion of civil liberties at home and human rights overseas.
The interconnections of intelligence and globalisation are especially problematic
because of the historic close associations of intelligence services, security services
and what might be termed ‘high policing’ with state sovereignty. Mathieu Deflem,
in a strongly Weberian analysis, has argued that the degree to which such security
institutions acquire formal bureaucratic autonomy is the key determinant for
international co-operation. While professional cultures of specialisation in this area
might be thought to drive co-operation across international boundaries, in fact the
close association of intelligence with national jurisdiction and ‘ownership’ of
intelligence ensures the persistence of nationality. Accordingly, while the perceived
rise in international crime and terrorism points towards co-operation, the partial
retreat of policy-makers back towards robust nation states over the last decade
often makes this more diﬃcult.10 Intelligence services are not themselves globalising
particularly fast. While there is more shared training and methodology, historically
security agencies have tended to be creatures of the state and intelligence sharing
9 R. Dover & M. Goodman (eds), Spinning Intelligence: British and American Intelligence and the
Media (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 4–13.
10 M. Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 32, 219.
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has rarely kept pace with their fleeting targets. Accordingly, while international
intelligence co-operation has become suﬃciently developed to pose problems for
oversight, it remains too hesitant to address fluid transnational opponents
eﬀectively.11
Policy-makers and intelligence chiefs have failed to think through the profound
consequences of globalisation for intelligence and security agencies. During the
1990s, many intelligence managers tended to read Fukuyama rather than
Huntingdon or Kaplan, and so were beset by moral panic in the face of
predictions about the ‘end of the history’. They mostly accepted the prospect of
a peaceful world in which liberal democracies would merely compete for aﬄuence
against the background of declining nation states.12 Certainly in the early 1990s
familiar enemies – both national and transnational – seemed to be melting away.
Not only had the Cold War had ended, but organisations such as the IRA had
moved away from armed struggle. Intelligence services were cut – but few were
fundamentally re-organised. In the UK in 1993, Sir Michael Quinlan undertook
a ‘Review of Intelligence Requirements and Resources’ and conceded that if the
UK was starting from scratch it would create diﬀerent sorts of agencies.13 They
resembled old and venerable family retainers, long in service, but tending towards
eccentricity.14
One of those who were sceptical about the arrival of perpetual peace was Sir
Colin McColl, Chief of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service. On 2 September 1991
he addressed new SIS recruits beginning their training course. McColl confidently
assured them of plenty of ‘unpredictability and instability’ in the post-Cold War
era.15 And so it proved to be. By the mid-1990s, the horizon had darkened and
continual civil wars in the Balkans transformed the European scene. In 1998, Tom
King, chair of the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee remarked that a few
years ago some had accused the agencies of simply inventing new threats ‘to justify
their existence’. However, the world now seemed a dangerous place and was ‘much
less predictable’. In a Kaplanesque moment he bemoaned the passing of the Soviet
Union, asking: ‘Was not the Cold War, in its awful way, a form of rigid security
system that has now collapsed?’16 In 1999, Tony Blair held a Downing Street
summit that concentrated on how the intelligence agencies might address the
growing threats from organised crime, narcotics, people-traﬃcking, arms smuggling
and internet banking fraud. Intelligence spending was already on the increase and
numbers of staﬀ at SIS were going up.17
11 A. Svendsen, ‘The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters’,
Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs, 21:1 (2008), pp. 129–44.
12 Francis Fukuyama was only one of many predictors; see for example the best-selling, W. B. Wriston,
The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World (New York:
Scribner’s 1992).
13 Government Communications Staﬀ Federation, Annual Report 1995, p. 27, MSS 384/3/37, Warwick
Modern Records Centre.
14 M. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence (London: Faber & Faber, 1996),
pp. 260–1.
15 R. Tomlinson, The Big Breach: From Top Secret to Maximum Security (Edinburgh: Cutting Edge,
2001), pp. 46–7.
16 Tom King, forward to UK Intelligence and Security Committee Report, 1997–8, Cm 4073 (London:
HMSO, 1998).
17 P. Gill, ‘Some Contemporary Developments in UK Security Intelligence’, CASIS Intelligence 36
(2000), p. 16.
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Ongoing eﬀorts to re-think the purpose of the intelligence services under
conditions of globalisation were soon occluded by the events of 9/11. Moreover,
the attack on the United States were followed quickly by the invasion of
Afghanistan and then the occupation of Iraq. This gave the intelligence services not
one, but two, high priority tasks – firstly to focus on the ‘new terrorism’, a threat
increasingly conflated with proliferation and second, support to major military
operations. In intellectual terms this represented a disaster, allowing managers to
side-step the challenge of thinking about complex networks and inter-related
transnational problems. Instead, they were directed to pursue specific tactical
threats and indeed specific people that were seen as the source of a new danger.
It was only in 2003 that the more reflective intelligence chiefs began to warn the
political leaders that the focus was perhaps too narrow, meanwhile emphasising the
underlying connections between increasing terrorism and globalisation. On 11
February 2003, George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, advised the Senate
that ‘globalization – while a net plus for the global economy – is a profoundly
disruptive force for governments to manage.’18
Intelligence in a borderless world
If information technology has been a major driver of globalisation then the internet
is its leitmotif. An obvious symptom of this has been the growing complexity and
volume of de-regulated financial and commercial transactions that sometimes defies
regulation or taxation. Eﬀorts by intelligence and security agencies to increase
surveillance of financial transfers over the last decade have been relatively
ineﬀective. Other expressions of state sovereignty are suﬀering erosion, including
the privilege of secure communications. After a complex technical and legal battle
in the 1990s, states are no longer the sole custodians of high-grade encryption,
which is now available to private organisations and even individuals. Open source
intelligence now rivals the state agencies, since vast amounts of detailed infor-
mation is now freely available about countries, commercial entities and individuals
via web sites or e-mail. Where this is not available from open sources it is oﬀered
for sale, often from companies run by former police and intelligence oﬃcers. In
short, sophisticated technical activities in the field of information, communications
and intelligence are no longer the preserve of states.
The decline of communications infrastructures dominated by the sovereign
state has also made the task of intelligence collection harder. For several centuries,
intelligence and security services have made use of the channels and choke points
created by a Westphalian order to pursue their business. A key example is signals
intelligence or ‘sigint’ – which has produced information on an industrial scale
since World War II. The telecommunications revolution of the last twenty years
has undermined the sigint agencies such as NSA and GCHQ that were once the
aristocrats of the intelligence world. Public key cryptography has extended to
private individuals the privilege of secret writing that for centuries was mostly
18 Testimony by George Tenet, DCI, to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘The Worldwide
Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World’, 11 February 2003, {https://www.cia.gov/
news-information/speeches-testimony/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html} accessed 22 July 2007.
894 Richard J. Aldrich
the preserve of princely ‘black chambers’. Although in practice only a minority
of malevolent groups resort to sophisticated packages like ‘Pretty Good Privacy’,
a degree of immunity to interception is oﬀered by the sheer exponential growth
in global communications. The world sends some thirty-five billion emails a day
and even if intelligence agencies could collect all this material they would not
know what to do with it.19 The main challenge since the 1990s has been the
problem of processing new streams of data that were growing at exponential
rates. Practitioners often liken this to trying to pour a glass of water with a
fire-hose.
The signals intelligence agencies like GCHQ and NSA have long been involved
in a cryptographic arms race with their competitors in the realm of diplomatic
communications. Now they are involved in a race against publicly available
technology – perhaps even against globalisation itself. Scientific advances provide
a novel form of personal inter-communication such as Skype, a voice over internet
protocol system, every two or three years. The internet revolution in communi-
cations is perhaps the most important example. During the 1970s, the ease with
which the agencies could intercept telephone traﬃc carried by microwave and
satellite, then analogue mobile phones, resulted in an intelligence bonanza.
However, beyond 2010, telephone calls will increasingly migrate to the internet.
Each telecom provider will have its own protocol, eﬀectively providing a layer of
encryption that will have to be stripped away, rendering sigint much more labour
intensive and, together with the growing volume of traﬃc, this poses an almost
insuperable problem. Agencies can, of course, search for evidence retrospectively,
or target the communications of individuals who they know are of interest, but in
a world of anonymous threats, agencies wish to screen the ever larger volumes of
international communications traﬃc.
The global communications revolution has therefore done much to level the
playing field between the ‘vigilant states’ of old and the new actors. Public
discussion of mobile phone interception has recently focused on terrorism, but
some of the most alarming examples come from the realm of organised crime. In
1994, security agents in Colombia entered a building owned by the Cali cocaine
cartel. To their surprise, they found a computer centre, staﬀed around the clock by
several technicians. The computer was an expensive IBM mainframe of the sort
used by banks, governments and universities. The initial presumption was that it
was a large accounting operation. However, once it was removed to the United
States for study it proved to be something far more alarming. The cartel had
constructed a database that captured the oﬃce and residential telephone numbers
of the local police, American diplomats and DEA agents in Colombia. This was
being cross-matched with the entire call log for the local telephone company over
several years, which was purchased illegally. The computer was deploying complex
data-mining software hitherto only used by intelligence service that focused on
tracing those who repeatedly called specific security and intelligence personnel. The
cartel was using this to hunt down informers. Colombian oﬃcials concluded that
this had led to the deaths of more than twelve human sources.20
19 In 2005, the United States was thought to undertaking somewhere short of a billion ‘intercept events’
a day across the spectrum of all communications. Private information.
20 P. Kaihla, ‘The Technology Secrets of Cocaine Inc.’, Business 2.0, July 2000 {http://www.cocaine.
org/cokecrime/index.html} accessed 2 August 2007.
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Communications intelligence also highlights one of the most intractable
problems posed by globalisation – the increased need for intelligence sharing. For
all the public commitment of policy-makers to greater intelligence co-operation,
the vast majority of intelligence co-operation remains clumsily bilateral. Early
examples of this problem occurred in the 1990s during the larger peacekeeping
operations in the former Yugoslavia. Here a United Nations compound often
contained numerous National Intelligence Cells all living in secure containerised
accommodation, reflecting absurd local compartmentalisation.21 This same phe-
nomenon has been visible in Afghanistan, which has been described as a veritable
‘Special Forces Olympics’ with elite elements from many states. Here, intelligence
support over the last five years has been lumpy due to national restrictions on the
release of sigint and satellite imagery that remain heavily compartmentalised.22
The familiar Cold War patterns of intelligence exchange, which were framed
around relative static targets and a limited range of allies, such as UKUSA, are
now too rigid when applied to terrorists or criminal enterprises. Significant tensions
are emerging between the broader sharing that the new global networked threats
seem to require and the established intelligence culture of rigorous source
protection. The problem is exacerbated by the growing need to share intelligence
beyond the state agencies. In Europe, this has meant controversy over provision
for international judicial bodies such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. More recently, with the growing privatisation of intelligence
activity in the United States, it has meant European material being released to
large-scale contractors such as Booz Allen.
Politicians and the press have tended to suggest that the sharing of more
intelligence is a panacea. However, the problem of sharing will not be overcome
easily, even if some magical answer is found to issues of national ownership and
source protection. The hard truth is that many services are simply not configured
to handle the increasing amounts of data that might be pooled. As Stephen
Lander, former Director General of MI5, has observed, the uncritical sharing of
large volumes of material can do more harm than good: ‘Some states collect
haystacks and keep haystacks, some services collect haystacks and keep needles,
some services only collect needles’. If America’s NSA shared its data with all of its
domestic and overseas partners the result would simply be overload.23
Fixing and enforcing
The roles of the intelligence and security services have changed in other ways under
the impact of globalisation. Arguably, the emphasis has shifted away from ideas
and information towards action. Superficially, this reflects the simple fact that their
opponents are now more ruthless and violent than those we encountered during the
Cold War. More fundamentally it may be symptomatic of societies that find it
increasingly diﬃcult to tolerate risk. In retrospect, the Cold War landscape now
21 C. Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia: 1992–1995 (The Hague: Lit Verlag, 2003).
22 Private information.
23 S. Lander, ‘International intelligence cooperation: an inside perspective’, Cambridge Review of
International Aﬀairs, 17:3 (2004), pp. 481–93.
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looks rather passive, a period when intelligence was seemingly about missile-
counting or else persuading ballerinas to defect. Admittedly, the distinctions can be
over-drawn. Certainly some of the human agents that the West employed in Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, China and especially North Korea came to a violent end.24
Notwithstanding this, there was distinct shift in the nature of secret service by the
late 1990s towards more kinetic activity.
On 9 December 1993, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern
observed that, in the post-Cold War era, the UK’s SIS was ‘not purely an
information-gathering service’ adding, rather delicately, that it was now also
‘tasked by Government to carry out other valuable services’.25 Even as he spoke
this trend towards more disruption and enforcement was being exemplified by an
accelerating anti-narcotics operations in Colombia where SIS superintended a
combined operation involving customs oﬃcers and special forces. The work of the
SIS station in Bogota was considerably expanded in the late 1990s and was widely
regarded as undertaking notably dangerous operational activity.26 British security
experts have been involved in Colombia for many years, but it often diﬃcult to
disentangle commercial from oﬃcial operations. Large British companies have
hired former UK special forces to protect their activities. Since 2002, the UK has
been the second largest provider of military aid and training to Colombia. This is
part of a wider trend in which the UK government itself now makes extensive use
of security consultants to assist in improving the performance of security forces in
foreign countries.27
The country that has travelled furthest down the road towards a culture of
enforcement has been the United States. Indeed, the pugnacious slogan that has
been adopted by senior US intelligence oﬃcials like General Michael Hayden is
‘find, fix and finish’. Once intelligence used to be a support activity that was largely
focused on estimating intentions and capabilities, but as Hayden recently
explained, this has changed. Intelligence is now inherently more operational.28
Globalisation has delivered the kind of problems where intelligence agencies
‘action’ the information themselves rather than passing it to bureaucrats.29 In this
respect, intelligence services are increasingly their own customers. Rendition, for
example, has been interpreted by many commentators as a programme of
information extraction, but it is increasingly clear that the main purpose was
degrading Al Qaeda’s core structure. In other words, this was primarily a special
action programme rather than an intelligence programme.30
24 Agent losses are discussed in P. Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divide Germany,
1945–60 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 142–7.
25 HL Deb 528, 1–12, 9 December 1993, col.1029.
26 A. Temple, ‘The Spy Who Loved Me’, The Guardian, 2 October 2002; David Smith, ‘SAS secretly
helps Bogota fight rebels’, The Independent, 22 October 1999.
27 D. Pallister et al, ‘Secret aid poured into Colombian drug war’, The Guardian, 9 July 2003.
28 M. W. Hayden, Central Intelligence Agency Director, ‘Intelligence in the 21st Century’, Remarks at
the Air Force Defense Strategy Seminar, Washington, D.C., 19 June 2007 http://www.af.mil/library/
speeches/speech.asp?id=332 accessed 23 July 2007.
29 The CIA drone operation in the Yemen against Qaed Senyan al-Harthi on 3 November 2002 is a
good example see D. Johnston and D.E. Sanger, ‘Yemen Killing Based on Rules Set Out By Bush,’
The New York Times, 6 November 2002.
30 House of Representatives (2007) ‘Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The
Impact on Transatlantic Relations’, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on
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Since 2004, the CIA has used broad, secret authority to join with special forces
to mount attacks against militants in Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere. The
Presidential Order relates to twenty countries with diﬀerent levels of approval
applying to each state, for example operations into Pakistan require presidential
approval. In 2006, a US Navy Seal team reportedly raided a compound of
suspected militants in the Bajaur region of Pakistan. This was watched in real time
at the CIA headquarters in Langley, since the mission was captured by the video
camera of a Predator drone aircraft. The raid on Syria on 26 October 2008, by no
means the first, was directed by the CIA with commandos operating in support.
Although missions have also been carried out in Iran, so far they had been of an
intelligence, rather than an ‘action’ nature.31
Action operations, especially the pursuit of individuals, often mean working
with unsavoury services. Most Western intelligence services now have strong
partnerships with ‘exotics’ with which they previously had less contact. This is
especially true of relations with some of the internal security services of Africa and
Asia who were almost unknown ten years ago. One recently retired CIA oﬃcer has
observed that while the external intelligence services of most smaller states are
regarded as ineﬀective, by contrast, the abilities of their internal services are valued
because they know their own country, moreover their ‘powers normally exceed
anything the FBI can do’.32 Another indicator is the expansion of shared training.
Twenty years ago, courses oﬀered to foreign intelligence oﬃcers were viewed as
diplomatic gesture, rather than real training. Now the emphasis has changed with
serious eﬀorts to up-skill overseas services. A further symptom of globalisation is
that training is no longer a one-way street. Countries with expertise in countering
suicide bombing, for example Sri Lanka, are now the trainers, while Western states
are the pupils.33
The growing literature on subjects such as torture and ‘targeted killing’ as tools
of state policy is a clear barometer of how far conventions have moved.34 The
majority of academic observers have tended to oﬀer stern warns about the
corrosive nature of heavy-handed activities.35 However, a surprising number of
practitioners, policy-makers, lawyers and even some academics have penned essays
asking whether current conditions do not necessitate violent behaviour. The best
known example is the work of the Harvard lawyer, Alan Dershowitz, who has
advocated judicially administered ‘torture warrants’. Although his suggestions have
been dismissed by some as absurd, in fact his comments neatly illuminate a
contemporary dilemma, namely the simultaneous demand for more robust security
activity and an emerging culture of greater regulation.36
Foreign Aﬀairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session, 17 April
2007, Serial No.110–28.
31 E. Schmitt and M. Mazzetti, ‘Secret Order Lets U.S. Raid Al Qaeda in Many Countries’, New York
Times, 10 November 2008.
32 G. Jones, ‘It’s a Cultural Thing’, p. 28.
33 Numerous counterterrorism oﬃcers from the UK have visited Sri Lanka and Israel in recent years
to examine the phenomenon of suicide bombing.
34 On assassination see, J. T. Richelson, ‘When Kindness Fails: Assassination as a National
Security Option’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 15:2 (2002),
pp. 243–74.
35 See for example A. Bellamy, ‘No Pain, No Gain: Torture and ethics in the war on Terror’,
International Aﬀairs, 82:1 (2006), pp. 121–48.
36 A. M. Dershowitz, ‘Want to torture? Get a warrant’, San Francisco Chronicle, 22 Jan. 2002, A19.
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Some clandestine work is being franchised out to private security agencies that
are less troubled by issues of jurisdiction. Admittedly, the primary driver here is
probably simple over-stretch rather than any complex notions of globalisation.
State agencies that were run down in the early 1990s do not have the capacity to
address counter-terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with the ‘old
new threats’ of the 1990s such as organised crime and now the revived issues of
counter-espionage presented by Russia and China. The growth of PMCs has been
widely commented on and need not be rehearsed in detail here.37 However, the
extent to which some PMCs are also to some degree private intelligence services is
often overlooked. One PMC operating in Iraq, CACI Inc. came to public notice
because it provided many of the interrogators and interpreters for the Abu Ghraib
prison. Another company called Diligence Inc. was founded by William Webster,
who previously headed both the CIA and the FBI. Its senior executive, Mike
Baker, was CIA field oﬃcer for some fourteen years. One of the hallmarks of the
war in Afghanistan is the frequency with which regular soldiers have remarked on
their encounters with free-booting privateers on special missions.38
Privatisation within the UK’s own intelligence community has rarely been
discussed in detail. A significant part of the infrastructure of GCHQ, the UK’s
largest intelligence organism, is now in private hands. In part, this reflects a major
change in management style and operations in the 1990s – which included ‘Signals
Intelligence New Systems’ or SINEWS – a programme that attempted to address
rapid technical change.39 Most visibly, its new building, occupied in 2003, is leased
from a consortium under a PFI contract. The entire mechanical engineering and
logistics element (M Division) was privatised and its 200 staﬀ transferred to Vosper
Mantech Ltd who also serviced the NSA station at Menwith Hill. Much of
GCHQ’s datastream is carried by a satellite network provided by companies such
as EADS Astrium and Paradigm.40 Intelligence activity in partnership with private
companies, or in co-operation with foreign partners, does not necessarily involve
unsavoury activity. However, all such partner activity presents challenging
problems for those tasked with oversight and accountability.
Regulation, accountability and global civil society
Perhaps the most perplexing challenge for intelligence in the era of globalisation is
presented by the contradictory demands of more active operations, sometimes of
a rather raw kind, set against expectations of ethical behaviour and good
37 J. Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation,
2007); R. P. Young, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Crown, 2006);
R. Merle, ‘Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq’, Washington Post, 5 December 2006.
38 T. Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2008).
39 SINEWS is referred to in NSA, ‘New Enterprise Team (NETeam) Recommendations: The Director’s
Work Plan for Change’, 1 October 1999, {http://cryptome.org/nsa-reorg-net.htm} accessed 12 June
2007.
40 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ): New Accommodation Programme, Report by
the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 955 Session 2002–2003: 16 July 2003 {http://www.nao.
org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/0203955.pdf} accessed 12 July 2007. On M Division see H C Deb,
23 Jan 1997: Column 1079.
Beyond the vigilant state 899
governance that were embedded in the 1990s. The rhetoric of global humanitari-
anism, used freely by politicians and oﬃcials over two decades is replete with
references to improved accountability, transparency and above all a culture of
regulation which reflects an increased sensitivity to risk. This manifested itself most
clearly in the rush to put European intelligence and security services onto a
statutory basis, triggering UK legislation in 1989 and 1994. Despite initial
misgivings on the part of intelligence oﬃcers, the result has been greater clarity and
confidence regarding routine operations. Whereas in the past, intelligence and
security services might only act if they felt they could do so discreetly, they now
carry out operations because they feel they are working on a sound legal basis.
This, in turn, has resulted in a higher volume of operations.
However, over time aspects of intelligence oversight have become more
problematic. Traditionally, all intelligence and security services have benefited from
the key distinction between domestic and foreign, or ‘inside and outside’. States
were able to employ this divide to resolve some of the abiding tensions between
security and liberty. This was achieved by permitting greater licence to foreign
intelligence services, compared to domestic security services. For example, in most
of Europe, the technical agencies have enjoyed unfettered communication inter-
ception activities abroad, while requiring warrants for some kind for interception
at home. However, under the pressure of current technological developments, the
distinctions between domestic and international communications are eroding. Now
a ‘hotmail’ message sent between two addresses in London may travel via the
United States on its journey. Is this a domestic communication or an international
one?
The recent NSA ‘warrantless intercept’ controversy in the United States
illustrates this well. NSA, the Americans signals intelligence agency, is permitted
to intercept foreign communications freely but is forbidden to eavesdrop on
Americans without a warrant. However, this law was designed for the era of the
telegraph and the telephone rather than the internet. Moreover, the increased
mobility of US citizens means that NSA often finds itself intercepting Americans
abroad unwittingly when both callers are geographically outside the United States
and perhaps speaking in Spanish. All these problems are underlined by a case that
was before federal judge in northern California in 2008. In a class-action suit, it
was alleged that AT&T Corporation are working with the NSA to implement a
vast warrantless surveillance programme that collects both domestic and foreign
communications and illegally monitors the communication records of millions of
Americans.41 The obvious question is why the NSA has been doing this illegally
when warrants are easily obtainable from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court? The answer is probably that judicial warrants only facilitate ‘retail’
surveillance, when what government requires is ‘wholesale’ surveillance and
data-mining. NSA now desires a degree of mass trawling of communications, in a
forlorn attempt to catch up with a wired world in which the distinction between
domestic and foreign means little.42
41 Arshad Mohammed, ‘Judge Declines to Dismiss Lawsuit Against AT& T’, Washington Post, 21 July
2006.
42 B. Schneier, ‘NSA and Bush’s Illegal Eavesdropping’, 20 December 2005 at {http://www.schneier.
com/blog/archives/2005/12/nsa_and_bushs_i.html} accessed 27 July 2007.
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Two further aspects of globalisation present particular problems for account-
ability. These are the increasingly exotic combinations of states involved in
intelligence co-operation and the growing tendency to make use of privateers. Both
phenomena can render the accountability mechanisms of national assemblies and
parliaments powerless, since regulators can only inquire into activities by their own
governments. Typically, rendition has involved partnerships between the United
States and countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Syria. These limitations are true
not only for routine standing committees, but also special commissions and courts.
In Canada, the inquiry by Justice Dennis O’Connor into the Mahar Arar rendition
case was able to call Canadian security personnel as witnesses, but failed to
persuade any Americans – even the American ambassador in Ottawa – to appear
before it. Nor was Justice O’Connor ever likely to obtain the answers he wanted
from Syria or Jordan.43
The natural opaqueness of multinational intelligence activities has a logical
remedy in the possibility of regional or international mechanisms of inquiry and
oversight. In 1998, when this idea was first suggested by David Bickford CB,
previously a legal adviser to both MI5 and SIS, few took the idea seriously.44
However, since 2005 we have seen real examples of such inquiries. At the regional
level there have been twin investigations into renditions and secret prisons by the
Council of Europe and the European Parliament. Unusually, General Michael
Hayden, Director of CIA, then briefed a number of European ambassadors at a
lunch hosted as the German Embassy in Washington. He tried to argue that many
reports were exaggerated and that only about 100 people have been moved
through the controversial programme. His remarks, which were widely reported,
were eﬀectively a CIA response to the European inquiries – perhaps a modest
‘first’ in the realm of transnational oversight. More unusual still is the
investigation into the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister, allegedly
by persons close to Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services, which has
been undertaken by a United Nations International Independent Investigation
Commission.45
In reality, commissions and inquiries, even if they are international, are no
longer the main avenue for intelligence accountability. Much of the information
that has driven recent inquiries has not come from oﬃcial testimony, but from
human rights watchers, activists and journalists. Global governance may be weak,
but global civil society has proved to be a surprisingly eﬀective sentinel.46 In June
2007, mundane open source material, accessed by journalists and researchers, led
to courts in Munich identifying the names of CIA oﬃcers and issuing arrest
warrants.47 Although national governments have been keen to assert public interest
immunity in these matters, in a globalising world it is increasingly hard to keep a
43 The findings of the enquiry are at {http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/}
44 Memorandum by David Bickford, ‘The Accountability of the Security and intelligence Services with
Particular Regard to the Security Service’, Appendix 2, UK Select Committee on Home Aﬀairs, 3rd
Report, Accountability of the Security Service, 21 June 1999 {http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmhaﬀ/291/291ap03.htm}
45 W. W. Harris, ‘Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk?’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 18:2 (2007),
pp. 37–60.
46 A. Florini, ‘The end of secrecy’, Foreign Policy, 111 (1998), pp. 50–63.
47 J. Goetz, M. Rosenbach and H. Stark, ‘Renditions Scandal: CIA Arrest Warrants Strain
US-German Ties’, Der Spiegel International, 25 June 2007.
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secret. Some of the same globalising processes that have degraded individual
privacy are also eroding state secrecy.
This will be exacerbated by the growing trend towards contracting out
intelligence activities. Traditionally, CIA oﬃcers who retire have, with very few
exceptions, dutifully submitted their memoirs to Langley’s oﬃcial clearing process
for sanitisation.48 It is unlikely that those working for Blackwater and Aegis will
observe the same niceties. Some have already acquired literary agents, and even
now, breathless memoirs are now being typed out on dusty laptops in Baghdad and
Kabul. Admittedly, it is hard to think of these world-weary warriors as active
promoters of transparency. However, the reality is that we already know far more
about intelligence during the last decade than we ever thought possible. Little of
this information has come to us through the formal channels of oversight and
enquiry. Ironically, while Western governments now display an increasing appetite
for secret work, globalisation ensures that few of these matters will remain hidden
for very long. Therefore, in the 21st century, one of the most likely impacts of
globalisation upon intelligence will be a growing climate of ‘regulation by
revelation’. Whatever the future direction of the vigilant state, the intelligence
services look increasingly likely to become unsecret services, and their activities are
unlikely to be very far from the public gaze.49
48 Most CIA memoirs are dull, often being mere travelogues. One of the few CIA memoirs to evade
the clearing process was R. B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam, 1976).
49 R. J. Aldrich, ‘Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, Transparency and the Media’, in R. Dover
and M. Goodman (eds), Known Knowns: British and American Intelligence and the Media (NY:
Columbia University Press, 2009).
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